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Summary The degree of risk of cross-infection of patients via lung function testing
equipment has yet to be quantified. Based on current evidence, elaborate
precautions are not justified for the majority of patients attending the laboratory,
but attention to appropriate routine cleaning and disinfection protocols is important.
Disinfection and sterilization can be achieved by a variety of methods, although
chemical methods should be used with caution. Identification of factors increasing the
susceptibility or infectivity of particular patients is important in determining
appropriate precautions. Where patients are known to be infectious or are immuno-
compromized, additional precautions such as using a barrier filter may be appropriate.
However, because of cost constraints, the routine use of barrier filters is difficult to
justify based on current evidence of minimal cross-infection associated with lung
function equipment. Until further studies have been conducted to quantify the degree
of risk of cross-infection that lung function test equipment poses, the recommenda-
tions given in this review provide a practical approach to dealing with this problem.
r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Within the lung function laboratory, expensive
testing equipment is used, with sometimes large
numbers of patients being tested on the same day. A
patient may undergo a range of tests, including
measurement of expiratory flow and volume,
invasive blood gases, sleep studies and the assess-
ment of response to inhaled medication or bronchial
provocation agents using nebulizers. Lung function
measurements are not, however, just restricted to
the laboratory, as a range of assessments and
treatments can be carried out in the patients own
home, including sleep studies, treatment for breath-
ing disorders during sleep and expiratory flow.
Patients attending the laboratory may be infec-
tious, whilst others may be more vulnerable to
infection, such as those undergoing immunotherapy.
Organisms may persist within the equipment, and in
some cases the equipment itself is difficult to clean
thoroughly. There is therefore a potential risk of
cross-infection between patients undergoing lung
function tests, including arterial blood gases. Whilst
this potential risk exists, there is little evidence that
lung function equipment poses a significant risk, and
case reports of cross-contamination are exceptional.
Whilst the potential risk is recognized, the experts
themselves cannot agree on the magnitude of the
potential risks or on how to deal with them, with
some of the recent recommendations being empiric
rather than being based on scientific data.1–3
With the increasing awareness of patients,
patient advocate groups and healthcare workers
to the possible risks, there is a need for clear
procedures to be in place to reduce possible risks to
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a realistic minimum. It is therefore surprising that
few recommendations exist.1–9 Furthermore, even
when they exist, lung function laboratories and
infection control departments appear to adopt
different approaches to solve the same problem,
as illustrated by two published audits.10,11
This review outlines the potential sources of
cross-infection; our current understanding of cross-
infection risks in the lung function laboratory and
equipment used in the home, the methods of
disinfection and sterilization available and con-
cludes with practical recommendations and sugges-
tions for future research.
Organisms possibly implicated in cross-
infection
Communicability of a disease within a lung function
laboratory is determined by numerous factors.
These include: (a) the source of the organisms,
e.g. blood, saliva; (b) the persistence of viability
outside the host; (c) the routes of infectivity; and
(d) the actual infective dose required to infect the
host and cause disease. Many factors further affect
the dose required to result in disease, including the
clinical condition and immune status of the subject
and the particle size of aerosols encountered
during respiratory testing.
Tuberculosis
Transmission occurs from organisms suspended in
droplets. These droplets may be produced by coug-
hing and possibly via forced expiratory manoeuvres
by patients with pulmonary tuberculosis.12,13 Dro-
plets containing Mycobacterium tuberculosis may
remain infectious for many hours. Droplets will
remain airborne longer if small, but in general,
organisms will remain viable longer in larger
droplets. In view of the increase in multi-drug
resistant tuberculosis infections, cross-infection of
these organisms is causing concern.14
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) cepacia
This motile gram-negative bacillus is not normally a
pathogen in humans, but it is associated with
marked respiratory function deterioration in cystic
fibrosis (CF) patients. In CF patients, there is
considerable patient-to-patient spread.15,16 The
CF Trust of Great Britain has recommended that
B. cepacia positive patients be separated from
those who are B. cepacia negative. Furthermore
the Trust has defined medium risk (handshaking,
social kissing) and high risk (sharing eating or
drinking utensils and intimate contact) activities.17
As these patients need to have lung function
monitored regularly, the risks of cross-infection
between patients must be assessed.17
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureas
(MRSA)
This presents particular problems in lung function
laboratories with the relative ease of transmission
from patient-to-patient, potentially via fomites
including equipment. Whilst recommendations ex-
ist for controlling the spread of MRSA,18 it has been
argued that trying to control the spread is unlikely
to be cost-effective in many situations and is either
unrealistic or ineffective in many cases.19,20 Mea-
sures to minimize transmission are based on good
basic hygiene, including hand washing, good-qual-
ity cleaning and ensuring that the work surfaces,
floors and walls of the department are suitable for
cleaning with appropriate cleaning agents. Lung
function equipment also needs to be easily cleaned
on the outside. Carpets, curtains should be kept to
a minimum in laboratories.
Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS)
Whilst the possibilities of transmission of pathogens
via respiratory function equipment were recog-
nized,21 the perceived risks were magnified with the
concerns about infection by the human immunode-
ficiency virus (HIV). This led to considerable anxiety
and the drive for ‘‘safer’’ lung function laboratories
and equipment.22,23 The reality, however, is some-
what different. Although fragments of the HIV virus
are found in human saliva,24 there is no current
evidence to suggest that HIV is transmitted from
saliva or expired gases or via respiratory expi-
rates.25 The few reported cases of transmission
between patients and dental workers are more
likely to have occurred through transmission via
blood rather than via saliva.26 In the ‘‘Florida
Dentist’’ outbreak, the mode of transmission re-
mains unknown.27 Despite these observations, salvia
is unlikely to a medium for transmission of HIV
infection, as the infection is not acquired by kissing.
Hepatitis
There are five recognized hepatitis viruses (A, B, C,
D and E). Of these, hepatitis B (HBV) poses the
main risk to healthcare workers. In its acute form,
it is transmitted via blood that contains a high
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concentration of viral antigens. The risk of trans-
mission is about 12–17% via accidental needle-stick
injuries, but may exceed 30% in unvaccinated
individuals. Healthcare workers with frequent
blood contact are at greatest risk.28
HBV may occasionally also be transmitted via
saliva as the HBV antigen has been identified in
saliva.29,30 Acquisition of HBV infection by oral
ingestion has been described, but only if the viral
dose is high.31 There is no current evidence that
HBV is transmitted via expired breath.
Hepatitis C has a similar mode of transmission to
HBV but is less infectious.32 The other bloodborne
hepatitis virus, D, can only infect individuals with
HBV infection. It is prevalent in the Mediterranean
area, Africa, South America and the Middle East but
rare in Western Europe.
Rhinovirus
Transmission of rhinovirus generally results from
deposition of the virus on surfaces during sneezing
or coughing and subsequent hand-to-nose man-
oeuvres, although aerosol transmission between
subjects in close proximity has been observed.33
Other upper respiratory tract flora
The upper respiratory tract of healthy children and
adults contain a wide range of flora including
Haemophilus influenzae, Branhamella catarrhalis
and Streptococcus pneumoniae. Whilst not pre-
senting a major problem to the majority of patients
undergoing lung function tests, they may pose
problems to immuno-suppressed patients, or those
compromised by other respiratory illness.
Hospital water supplies
It is well documented that hospital water supplies
can be contaminated with Mycobacteria and Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa organisms.34–39 There is poten-
tial for patients and healthcare workers to deposit
microorganisms onto equipment surfaces, which may
subsequently come into direct or indirect contact
with other patients. Where patients have competent
immune systems, this is unlikely to be an appreci-
able threat from drinking water used for hand
washing.38 However, in some patients, such as those
with cystic fibrosis, there may be increased risks.36
Legionella
This is a gram-negative bacillus found worldwide in
lakes, air conditioning cooling towers40 and water
systems.41–43 Patients at risk are the elderly and
those with compromized cellular immunity or
respiratory function, such as smokers. Its mode of
transmission is by inhalation of aerosols. To this
extent, care needs to be taken when using
nebulizers as these have been shown to act as a
source of transmission.42,43
Current knowledge regarding lung
function equipment
The potential to grow pathogens in lung function
equipment and the subsequent transmission of
pathogens via this equipment has been reported
in few studies. Up to 1980, no reports of nosocomial
transmission of disease via lung function equipment
had been reported to the Center for Communicable
Disease.4 This may be because few, if any, cases
have been linked to cross-infection caused by lung
function equipment, publication bias, the imprac-
ticality of performing large scale monitoring stu-
dies, and probably the lack of enthusiasm for this
type of study. This has resulted in no evidence base
to demonstrate risk at the clinical level.
Spirometers
Houston et al.44 assessed the Vitalograph tubing
using discrete swabs from various locations and
observed a range of flora, none of which were
significantly pathogenic. Leeming et al.45 carried
out a similar study using Vitalograph tubing but
washed the inside of the tube with a broth. No
significant pathogens were obtained. Similarly,
Rutala et al.46 and Marchant et al.47 observed that
low numbers of respiratory flora were present in
spirometers. In contrast, Singh et al. reported
significant bacterial contamination of spirometer
tubing, including Aspergillus and acid-fast bacilli.48
Marchant et al.47,49 suggested the use of apparatus
similar to that recommended by Denison et al.23 in
patients with cystic fibrosis where an inspiratory
flow-volume curve is required.
Burgos et al.50 noted that colonization of water-
filled spirometers occurred within 3 days of use,
mainly in the distal tubing, the water and the bell
itself. They could not demonstrate any transmission
sequence from machine to patient. A few colonies
of microorganisms were obtained from a heated
Lilly pneumotachograph.
Recently, Hiebert et al.51 demonstrated that
Escherichia coli introduced as an aerosol into
spirometry tubing could be recovered from air
drawn from the proximal end of the spirometry
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tube only transiently (1–2min after inoculation).
No E. coli was recovered after 5min. No assess-
ments of flow-based systems were performed, and
this remains an area for further investigation.
Ultrasonic spirometers, where the parts of the
flow head are in contact with the patient and their
exhaled air are replaced after each patient do not
appear to become contaminated.52 Similarly, some
newer spirometers are employing disposable, pre-
calibrated flow heads, thus reducing the risk of
cross-infection. There is no data currently available
on unheated pneumotachographs, turbine spirom-
eters or hot-wire spirometers.
Two publications have presented circumstantial
evidence of the transmission of infection by
respiratory function testing equipment, although
in neither case was the aetiological agent recovered
from the implicated instrument.12,53 In the first
case, one of 22 patients who used the test device
after use on a patient with pulmonary tuberculosis
converted from tuberculin skin test negative to
positive within 10 weeks. The organism was not
isolated from the secondary case or the spirom-
eter.12 In the study by Gough et al.53 intermittent
outbreaks of infections on a ward with a specific
strain of H. influenzae did not recur after a one-way
valve and barrier filter were used in the spirometer
circuit. Again, no organisms were recovered from
the spirometer tested before insertion of the filter.
Peak flow meters
Despite their common use, only one study has
assessed the contamination of Mini-Wright peak
flow meters.54 This study found fungal contamina-
tion in regularly used meters although their
mechanical operation was not affected and no
incidents of cross-infection were reported.
Whether there are any long-term effects of
repeated use of contaminated meters is unclear,
particularly since they now form an integral part of
self-management. Other commercially available
peak flow meters have not been assessed.
Meters such as the Mini-Wright often include a
plastic flap which prevents subjects from inhaling
from these devices, thereby reducing the potential
for cross-infection where these devices are used in
hospitals with different patients.
Lung volumes and gas transfer equipment
There are few reports assessing the microbiological
contamination of equipment used to measure static
lung volumes.21,46 Whilst these reports have shown
that mouthpieces and proximal tubing are likely to
be contaminated neither showed evidence of
contamination of the interior surfaces of a volume
displacement spirometer.
No reports appear on the potential for cross-
infection from body plethysmographs or gas trans-
fer equipment. Whilst the parts of the test circuit
directly in contact with the patient will be
contaminated with condensation, the internal
surfaces of both rolling-seal spirometers and
heated pneumotachographs appear to be free from
contamination. With heated pneumotachographs,
this may be due to maintaining a dry environment
hostile to microorganisms and may reduce the time
period organisms remain viable. This would concur
with the findings of Burgos et al.50 However, in
unheated pneumotachographs, condensation can
form on the resistive screen, thereby providing a
suitable environment for organisms to grow.
Organisms do not appear to survive inside rolling
seal spirometers. It has been suggested that where
soda lime absorbers are used, the soda lime is
sufficiently caustic to kill contaminants as they pass
through the absorber. However, the circuit proximal
to the absorber may still be contaminated.
Nebulizers in therapeutic use
Large volume nebulizers and humidifiers have
frequently been associated with the episodes of
hospital-associated pneumonia and outbreaks of
nosocomial disease. Small volume nebulizers are
increasingly used in respiratory laboratories, hos-
pital wards and in the home, in both adult and
paediatric practice and in acute and domiciliary
settings for a variety of respiratory disorders.55,56
There is no direct evidence that these nebulizers
are responsible for the acquisition of infecting
organisms that lead to increased length of hospital
stays or increased hospital admissions when guide-
lines for use and cleaning have been followed.
However, studies have shown that nebulizers can
harbour a variety of microorganisms, even when
patients and hospital staff have cleaned the
devices correctly.43,44,56–67
Of prominence are the studies on patients with
cystic fibrosis.57–60 Pitchford et al.58 observed
contamination of home inhalation equipment with
Pseudomonas species. Furthermore, they noted
that there was reinfection in patients with CF
colonized with S. aureus and P. aeruginosa. This
reinfection appeared to be reduced by regular
changing of equipment and use of cleaning agents.
Kuhn et al.59 investigated nebulized drugs used by
CF patients and observed Bacillus cereus contam-
ination of these dispensed solutions for home used
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within 5 days of dispensation. Hutchinson et al.60
isolated B. cepacia from about 10% of home
nebulizers, but whilst P. aeruginosa was present in
virtually all patients, it was not observed in their
nebulizer chambers. In most cases, the heaviest
contamination appeared beneath the baffles. This
appeared to be reduced in patients with good
nebulizer hygiene, including drying the nebulizer
after washing. It was concluded that nebulizers are
likely to be the primary source rather than sites of
secondary contamination derived from the pa-
tients’ secretions. This is in contrast to nebulizers
in mechanical ventilator circuits, which tend to be
used for shorter periods but which have been
observed to become contaminated with bacteria
from patients’ respiratory tract.61
In patients with asthma and COPD, most of who
will be using nebulized bronchodilators, few studies
in the home have been performed.62–66 Higgs
et al.62 noted contamination and observed that
cultures were composed of non-pathogenic organ-
isms. Jones et al.63 observed about two-thirds of
nebulizer solutions were contaminated with pseu-
domonads, whilst Barnes et al.64 and Childs and
Dezateux65 observed home nebulizers were con-
taminated with various flora, including B. cepacia.
Recently, we have observed that nebulizer
chambers returned during normal outpatients’
assessments were contaminated with mixed gram-
negative bacilli.66 In this study of 23 patients with
COPD or asthma, only 11 patients cleaned their
nebulizer chambers after each use and six cleaned
them fortnightly or less. Comparing visual inspec-
tion with microbiological assessment showed agree-
ment with the level of contamination in only 7/23
chambers. In particular, many chambers yielded
heavy microbiological growths, but appeared visibly
clean. In a review of their nebulizer service, Smyth
et al. observed that only 29% of patients washed
their chamber after every use and 21% had never
washed the chamber over the previous 12 months.67
To date there is no data investigating the
problems of colonization of small volume nebulizer
chambers in hospital wards or lung function depart-
ments. Since many patients admitted to respiratory
wards will stay for extended periods, there is the
potential for significant contamination to occur.
Environmental contamination: The sources of
contamination of nebulizers in home use have not
been fully established in CF, asthma or COPD, and in
particular, the areas used for cleaning nebulizers
and dispensing drugs. In the hospital environment,
no data is available on the range of microorganisms
already present in the environment surrounding the
site of nebulization or in the drug preparation and
cleaning areas.
Risks of contamination: There is no evidence that
nebulizers are responsible for the acquisition of
infecting organisms that lead to increased length of
hospital stays or increased occurrence of hospital
admissions for patients with CF, asthma or COPD.
Clearly, there is a potential risk of infection of
patients from nebulizers, and possibly from nebu-
lizers to other patients or family members. With
the increasing awareness of patients and health-
care workers to the possible risks, there is a need
for procedures to be in place to reduce these risks
to a realistic minimum.
Nebulizers in diagnostic use
Nebulizers are used for a variety of diagnostic
procedures, of which the principle one in lung
function laboratories will be bronchial chal-
lenges.68 No recommendations were given on
cleaning nebulizers used in these challenges. It
was recognized that some laboratories use the
same nebulizer solutions and the same nebulizers
on different patients. In some set-ups, this may
result in patients inhaling a previous patient’s
exhalate or an aerosol of their secretions. Again,
there is no data on this being a risk factor for cross-
contamination, but is of obvious concern.
Blood gas analyzers
Blood gas analysis poses specific risks, mainly of
needle-stick injuries. There are a few reports of
infections resulting from contaminated equipment
used for collecting and analyzing blood gas sam-
ples.69–74 Care must be taken in the handling of the
blood samples, maintenance of the blood gas analyzer
and its surrounding environment must be regularly
cleaned and any spillages mopped-up immediately.
Methods of disinfection and sterilization
A variety of methods exist for the disinfection and
sterilization of equipment (Table 1). Having deter-
mined whether disinfection is sufficient or sterili-
zation is required, the choice will depend upon
ease of use, compatibility with equipment and
ultimately cost. Despite the trend to centralize
decontamination services to improve process con-
trol, methods that are available within and under
the control of the laboratory are often preferred by
users since costs can be minimized and turn-around
of equipment is rapid. This obviates the need for
large stocks of reusable items.
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Table 1 Comparison of decontamination methods.
Method Applications Advantages Disadvantages Range of kill
Hand-hot soapy water Small itemsFtubing,
mouthpieces, facemasks
(1) In department (1) Requires clean area Physically removes
microorganisms
(2) Removes organic & inorganic debris (2) May require additional use
of alcohol-impregnated
cloths
Commercial washer
disinfector
Small itemsFtubing,
mouthpieces, facemasks
(1) In department (1) High initial cost Vegetative bacteria, most
viruses, TB (equivalent to
pasteurization)
(2) Easy to use (2) Requires specific electric
supply
(3) Pre-cleaning not normally required
(4) Dries items
High-temperature steam
(usually 1341C or 1211C)
Heat-stable itemsFitems
with lumen if vacuum cycle
used
(1) Items can be wrapped Not ‘‘on site’’ (necessitates
large stock of items)
Sterilizing method
Dries item
Low-temperature steam
(LTS; approx. 731C)
Moderately heat-stable
itemsFitems with lumen
(vacuum cycle), e.g. tubing,
mouthpieces, facemasks
(1) Items can be wrapped Not ‘‘on site’’ (necessitates
large stock of items)
Vegetative bacteria, most
viruses, TB, not hepatitis B
(2) Dries item
Alcohol-impregnated
cloths
Small items that can be easily
wiped and work-surfaces
(1) Easy to use (1) Efficacy dependent on
thoroughness of user
(parts of article easily
missed)
Vegetative bacteria,
enveloped viruses (if contact
time is sufficient)
(2) Exposure times achieved
usually very short
Chlorine-releasing agents Items immersed for 15–30min (2) In department (1) Items not dried Vegetative bacteria, viruses
(3) Rapid process (2) Corrodes most metals
(3) Inactivated by organic
matter
Activated 2%
gluteraldehyde
Items damaged by heat or
other chemicals (e.g. flexible
endoscopes)
(1) In department (1) Items not dried Vegetative bacteria, viruses
including HIV and hepatitis TB
after 40–60min exposure
Bacterial spores after 3 h
(2) Very good material compatibility (2) Respiratory and cutaneous
toxicity (requires fume
cupboard)
1
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A commercial dishwasher, providing disinfected,
clean and dry items may be a suitable long-term
investment. In the UK, performance specifications
and maintenance schedules for washer-disinfectors
are given in HTM 2030.75
Whatever method is used to decontaminate
equipment, it is important to note the manufac-
turer’s recommendations on material compatibility,
the number of times each piece of apparatus can be
decontaminated before significant structural dete-
rioration is experienced, and any other cautionary
notes. Where chemical methods are used, the
correct dilution for the application must be
determined, and the length of time each item is
immersed should be followed with care. Working
solutions of chlorine-releasing agents should be
discarded immediately after use, or at the least on
a daily basis, even if unused. Gluteraldehyde (2%)
may, within limitations, be reused for up to 2
weeks, but its effectiveness declines due to dilution
when used in a washing machine. At 1% or less,
adequate disinfection cannot be guaranteed.
Health and safety issues must also be considered.
Gluteraldehyde, for instance, must be used with
good extract ventilation and personal protective
equipment since up to 30% of exposed staff become
sensitized. The low occupational exposure limits
that have recently been introduced mean that the
use of gluteraldehyde is no longer practicable in
most respiratory departments. A number of less-
irritant alternatives to gluteraldehyde for high
level disinfection are now available.76,77
Barrier filters
Barrier filters have been heralded by some as the
solution to reducing the risk of infection from lung
function equipment, where the subject has to
breathe via a mouthpiece from a breathing cir-
cuit.49,78 Filters have been used for many years in
intensive care units, but their use in lung function
laboratories has occurred only recently.
The choice of filter is important. Early filters
were reported to have high bacterial retention
rates.79 However, the methods used to assess
bacterial retention have been questioned, and
these filters were subsequently shown to have a
bacterial retention efficiency of about 67%.80
Recently, filters using more efficient filter media,
have been demonstrated to be about 99.9%
efficient using flow rates up to 750 lmin1 and
about 97% efficient at removing bacterial colony
forming particles when patients perform forced
expiratory manoeuvres through them.81 In a com-
parison of six filters, the efficiency of removal of
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P. aeruginosa from air containing 1 104 CFUml1
ranged from 27.7% to 100%.82 The threshold above
which some bacteria passed through the filters
ranged from 1 108 to o1 104 CFUml1.
Placing an efficient barrier filter between the
patient and the respiratory circuit will not only
provide protection to the entire circuit from
contamination with exhaled microorganisms, but
will also protect the patient from inhaling particles
from within the circuit. Furthermore, as sensors are
now being placed closer to the patient, they will
provide protection to these delicate components
from exhaled particulates. However, no filters are
100% effective, and their use does not preclude the
need for adequate cleaning of the equipment.83
Barrier filters have been shown to reduce peak
flow, but have little effect on measures of timed
forced expiratory volume.84–89 The reductions in
peak flow and in dynamic lung volumes are small (2–
4%) and clinically insignificant. There are no reports
of the effectiveness of filters in reducing or
eliminating nosocomial transmission of disease during
measurements of absolute lung volumes, gas transfer
or during exercise. However, if filters minimize risks
during forced respiratory manoeuvres, then they
should work for these other test procedures.
For measurements of CO transfer factor, the
additional dead-space of the filter will need to be
included in the calculations. Similarly, where air-
ways resistance is assessed, either in a body
plethysmograph or using forced oscillometry tech-
niques, then the added resistance of the filter needs
to be taken into account. During exercise tests, the
aim will be to keep both the circuit resistance and
dead-space as low as possible, especially when
assessing perception of breathlessness.90
There is also no data on the effects of these
filters when used over a series of test procedures on
a single patient, although repeated expiratory
blows do not appear to increase flow resistance.91
This is important as some laboratories use a new
filter for each patient, whilst others use a single
filter for a whole day or week. Use of the same
barrier filter for multiple patients could result in
patients inhaling organisms entrained in the filter
medium following previous use. Thus, there is an
argument for the routine, single patient use of
filters for respiratory function tests.91
Costs
One factor in deciding which methods of infection
control to apply in a laboratory will be cost. Whilst
everyone is aware of this, there is little data
comparing the costs of the various forms of
infection control available to lung function labora-
tories.
Side et al.91 published a cost comparison of filters
versus the current Thoracic Society of Australian &
New Zealand (TSANZ) guidelines.8 This analysis
showed that in a busy laboratory the cost per test
of using a barrier filter was on average about 5 times
cheaper than the implementation of the guidelines.
If, as the authors assume, we accept that the
universal precautions approach taken by the TSANZ
guidelines offer a comparable degree of protection
to the use of barrier filters, then the use of filters is
a sensible cost-effective alternative to cleaning and
disinfecting equipment between patients.
An alternative approach is to use a commercial
instrument dishwasher that provides disinfected, dry
items.92 Although the initial installations costs are
high (approximately d11,700) this may be a cheaper
option than the use of barrier filters. Based on our
current throughput of patients over a 5-year period
(21,960 patients) and including maintenance and
consumable costs, the overall cost of using a dish-
washer would be about d20,600, or d0.94 per patient.
This compares favorably with the cost of d1.18 per
bacterial filter.93 Furthermore, it should be remem-
bered that the use of filters does not eliminate the
need to clean breathing circuits on a regular basis.83
What are we protecting from what?
When deciding what we are trying to protect, it is
important to look at the environment, the equip-
ment and the patient. Hospitals by their nature,
are dealing with sick, infected and immuno-
compromized patients and transmission of patho-
gens a regular occurrence.94–99 Individuals walking
along a hospital corridor or sitting in a crowded
waiting room will incur a finite risk of exposure to a
wide range of pathogens.
For the majority of patients, there will be no
significant risk of cross-infection from having lung
function tests, and they will pose little risk to other
patients through contamination of the equipment.
As with any risk assessment exercise, the severity
of the consequence of cross-infection is important
in determining appropriate interventions. In some
patients, a common cold may be acquired, but
although inconvenient, this would be categorized
as a low risk. Tuberculosis would normally be
considered a higher risk, regardless of the relative
risk of acquisition, because it is a serious infection.
The problem faced by many laboratories is
identifying who is infected with significant patho-
gens and who is at increased risk. One approach is
to request this information at the time of referral.
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In a recent audit of two teaching hospital labora-
tories, both of whom request this information
before performing any breathing tests, approxi-
mately 84% of patients were referred with ‘‘no
known infection’’, 10% where immuno-compro-
mized, 2% had a chest infection and the remaining
4% were MRSAþ , HEP B/Cþ , or TBþ .100
‘‘At risk’’ patients
Immuno-compromised patients are potentially at
greater risk of acquiring a variety of infections,
although there is a no evidence that they have an
increased morbidity or mortality after lung function
testing. It is important, however, to minimize the
risks. Precautions can range from the elaborate21,23
to the simple.47,78 One approach is to assess these
patients at the start of the day when the apparatus
has been thoroughly cleaned and dried.
Patients with cystic fibrosis tend to be more
susceptible to the risks of cross-infection by certain
organisms and precautions should be taken to
reduce these risks, although the evidence for
cross-infection from respiratory function equip-
ment is not proven. Guidelines to deal with this
have been published.27,101
Infected patients
Patients with identified infection transmissible by
the respiratory route, or who would require
isolation if the patient were an inpatient (consult
local infection control guidelines), require precau-
tions to be taken. It would be appropriate to
question the need for lung function tests, and
possibly to limit the range of tests. Where the tests
are considered essential for the clinical manage-
ment of the patient, then the tests should be
performed at the end of the day or similar
precautions taken for those ‘‘at risk’’.
Overly concerned patients/patient advocate
groups
A very small number of patients demand information
on the risks of cross-infection from the breathing
circuits being explained to them and what precau-
tions are being taken to eliminate all risks of cross-
infection. Similarly, some patient advocate groups
expect precautions to be taken, despite there being
no evidence to suggest a risk exists. For these
patients, protocols need to be in place to satisfy
them that the risks are reduced to an absolute
minimum. Use of a bacteria-retentive filter is
normally sufficient to reassure such patients.
Approaches to infection control
Infection control practices adopted by laboratories,
and their underlying assumptions might be categor-
ized as follows:
1. Universal precautions: All patients are treated
as if they were infective to other patients and
susceptible to infection carried by these pa-
tients. Consequently, it is appropriate to take
stringent universal precautions to prevent the
patient coming into direct contact with the test
equipment, either by using specifically designed
equipment12,14 or the use of a barrier filter with
every patient.49,78 There is little current evi-
dence supporting this approach.
2. Minimal precautions: Patients are considered to
be at no significant risk, regardless of clinical
state. With this assumption we would take
minimal precautions, cleaning the breathing
circuits on a ‘‘when it looks dirty’’ basis or when
the equipment surface has visible condensation.
Despite the lack of persuasive evidence that
respiratory function testing equipment transmits
infection, this approach would be considered by
many to be inadequate, particularly for poten-
tially susceptible patients such as those with
cystic fibrosis.
3. Evidence-based approach: Although there is
scant evidence of cross-infection in respiratory
laboratories,44–51 risk assessments justify en-
hanced infection control precautions for some
patient groups, including those with an identi-
fied respiratory infection or in those who are
immuno-compromized. For most patients, sim-
ple routine precautions are taken, with addi-
tional precautions introduced only for these
identified high-risk patients.
Recommendations based on limited evidence are
likely to prove controversial. Some guidelines, such
as those from the TSANZ8 have been criticized as
impracticable or costly.91,102 The TSANZ guidelines
are summarized in Table 2. It is important that
guidelines are readily implemented and cost
effective whilst reducing any real or perceived
risks of cross-infection to a level acceptable to staff
and patients.
Recommendations
The following recommendations cover the range of
equipment used in a typical respiratory laboratory,
and has proved practical and cost-effective ap-
proach to infection control. We have graded these
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recommendations based on the levels of evidence
available in each case103,104 as follows:
(A) Randomized control trial data.
(B) Well-conducted study, but no randomized
control trial.
(C) Expert committee reports or opinions and/or
clinical experience of respected authorities.
There are no grade (A) studies in the literature. The
majority of opinion comes from expert committees or
clinical experience, and that itself appears to be
based on empiric rather than experimental or trial-
based evidence. To this extent, we have marked those
recommendations as (C). The recommendations are
summarized in Table 3, with the relevant explanation
and evidence given in the following review.
Single-use, single-patient use and reusable
items
Equipment used in departments and in patient’s
homes, such as nebulizers, are usually classified as
single-use, single-patient use or reusable and in
Europe manufacturers are required to mark their
products as such. Single-use items should be used
once only and then discarded.105 Single-patient use
items may be used by the same patient repeatedly,
with cleaning taking place after each use. Reusable
items can be used on different patients as long as
appropriate reprocessing, as indicated by the
manufacturer, is followed. This categorization
means that both the manufacturer and the labora-
tory manager need to define the extent and the
methods by which ‘‘single-patient use’’ and reusa-
ble devices should be used and reprocessed. Advice
should be obtained from the manufacturer as to
appropriate methods of reprocessing and the
number of times each device should be repro-
cessed.
Adherence to the stated category of equipment
use should occur at all times. Where this is
impracticable, changes can only be made based
on consultation and agreement with the manufac-
turer and employers’ safety committee (C).
Determining infectivity and susceptibility of
referred patients
Where a patient has a known infection, such as
MRSA, TB or a chest infection, or the patient is
immuno-compromized this should be indicated on
the form requesting respiratory function tests.
Space should be allocated for this on the request
form and must be completed by the referring
clinician to the best of their knowledge. The
reliability of information given on request forms
would be a suitable topic for local audit to
ensure that the system is identifying as many
high-risk patients as is practical. Where the
patient does have a known infection, it may be
appropriate to question the urgency and need
for these tests. If the tests are essential for the
clinical management of the patient, then addi-
tional precautions may be required, over and
above normal laboratory practice. Precise precau-
tions, including the use of barrier filters, gowns,
gloves, etc., and the disposal or sterilization of
equipment should be formulated in conjunction
with the local Infection Control department and
the equipment manufacturer, and should be appro-
priate for the infectivity and severity of the
potential infection.
According to local circumstances, patients with
known infections may be tested: (a) on equipment
that is easily disinfected, (b) at the end of the day,
(c) in their own room or in rooms specifically
designed for such patients, or (d) using of a barrier
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Table 2 Summary of the TSANZ guidelines for infection control in lung function laboratories from reference 91.
1. Disassemble equipment to allow the physical removal of particulate matter
2. Clean thoroughly with a suitable detergent to reduce microbial load
3. Rinse with tap water to remove traces of detergent
4. Disinfect according to the Centres for Disease Control (CDC) category of the itemFsemi-critical
itemsFthose coming into contact with mucous membranes such as non-disposable mouthpieces,
pneumotachographs and breathing valves should be cleaned and disinfected between consecutive
patients; most suitably by immersion in a 70% solution of either ethanol or isopropyl alcohol for 20min
(modified CDC recommendation). Non-critical itemsFthose coming into contact with intact skin or have
no direct contact with patients such as closed or open breathing hoses distal to the breathing valve.
These should be cleaned daily with a suitable detergent.
5. Rinse thoroughly with water
6. Air dry
The effectiveness of the TSANZ guidelines in eliminating the possibility of cross-infection has not been evaluated.
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filter in combination with (a)–(c). Use of barrier
filters is highly recommended for patients with
serious infections spread by the airborne route such
as TB (C).
Handwashing
This is the single most important step in preventing
nosocomial infections. After dealing with each
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Table 3 Summary of recommendations on infection control in lung function departments.
Recommendation Grade
Single-use,
Single-patient
use and re-usable
items
Adhere to the stated category of equipment use at all times. Category
changes can only be made after consultation and agreement with the
manufacturer and employers’ safety committee
C
Precautions for
infectious
patients
Patients with known infections may be tested (a) on disease-specific
equipment, (b) at the end of the day, (c) testing the patients in their
own room or in rooms specifically designed for such patients, or (d) use
of a barrier filter in combination with (a)–(c). Use of barrier filters is
highly recommended for patients with serious infections spread by the
airborne route such as TB
C
Handwashing Wash hands between patients with soap and water or antiseptic
preparation
B
Cleaning of
surfaces, sanitary
and washing
facilities
Clean at least daily, using appropriate cleaning agents B
Nebulizers and
cone spacers
Should be cleaned and dried between use, where single-patient use or
reusable chambers are used
B
Patient education for home use is essential C
Medications and
fluids
Use single-dose drug preparations, single-patient use devices, sterile
water and rigorous protocol
B
Blood gas analysis
and blood gas
analyzers
Use national guidelines for the handling and processing of blood
samples and the use of blood gas analyzers
B
Mouthpieces Change between patients. Clean appropriately or discard B
Noseclips Use rubber noseclips and clean with alcohol wipes between patients C
Peak flow meters Use as single-patient use at home. In laboratories use one-way
mouthpieces or filters where inspiration is not required
C
Breathing circuits TubingFclean regularly. Patient valvesFclean between patients with
alcohol wipes. A barrier filter may be useful for infectious or immuno-
compromized patients where patients handle equipment there is an
increased risk of cross-infection
C
Wipe equipment with alcohol-impregnated wipes between patients B
Water-sealed
spirometers
Change water every 2 days for water-sealed spirometers B
Rolling seal, heated pneumotachographsFminimal cleaning required,
remove dust
B
Exercise testing
equipment
Wipe down treadmill or bicycle at the end of each testing session C
With invasive blood gas analysisFas for blood gas analyzers B
Breathing circuitsFas above. Replace breathing valves between
patients and clean using appropriate techniques for the heat sensitivity
and chemical sensitivity
C
Sleep study
equipment
Clean probes and reusable electrodes between patients using alcohol
wipes
B
Washable componentsFchest wall belts, CPAP head caps, etc., should
be washed in a washing machine to the highest temperature possible
C
CPAP componentsFreuse within the manufacturers guidelines, e.g.
low-temperature steam treatment
C
Domiciliary
equipment
Patient education on the handling and cleaning of equipment is
essential
C
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patient, hands should be washed thoroughly with
soap and water or with an appropriate antiseptic
soap (B).
Cleaning of surfaces
Despite the current practice of reducing costs on
cleaning and hygiene,97 work surfaces, floors and
washing facilities should be washed daily with
detergent. The surfaces of equipment should be
cleaned daily, particularly parts that patients may
handle during testing. Spills of blood or other body
fluids must be cleaned up immediately according to
local guidelines (B).
Nebulizers, Cone Spacers and metered dose
inhalers
Nebulizer chambers are classified as single-use,
single-patient use or reusable. Single-patient use
devices may be used repeatedly by the same
patient, with cleaning and drying taking place
between each nebulization. Reusable chambers
can be used on different patients as long as
appropriate reprocessing occurs. The manufacturer
should provide advice on the number of times
that a chamber can be reprocessed and what
agents should be used. Whatever agent is used,
the effect of cleaning must not significantly affect
performance.
Cone Spacers are either single-patient or reusa-
ble, and there is currently no evidence of a risk of
cross-infection from cone spacers.
In general, most single-patient use and reusable
chambers can be cleaned with hand-hot soapy
water, rinsed thoroughly and then dried either with
a tissue or by blowing air through the chamber.106 A
dishwasher also works very well, without any
apparent effect on performance. Drying is probably
the most important part of the process to prevent
microbial colonization during storage.
Patient education is an essential component of
the management of patients using such devices at
home, and probably requires re-enforcing at each
outpatient follow-up visit (C).
Recently there has been some concern about re-
use of metered dose inhalers (MDI). There is no
current evidence that there is a risk of cross-
infection from the MDI and the suggestion that
placebo MDI’s should be single-patient use is highly
questionable. Manufacturer’s must provide evi-
dence to support this.
Decontamination of the MDI holder can be
achieved as for cone spacers above.
Medications and fluids
All medications and fluids should be used under
aseptic conditions. Only sterile fluids should be
used in nebulizers. Where feasible single-dose
medication vials should be used for each patient.
No medication should be used after the stated
expiry date (B).
Blood gas analysis and blood gas analyzers
In view of the hazardous nature of blood, safety
precautions on the taking, handling and analysis of
blood are paramount. Procedures and safety pre-
cautions have been outlined in UK national guide-
lines on lung function testing108 and these or
equivalent national guidelines should be followed
closely (B).
Respiratory function equipment
There is a range of equipment used in the
laboratory, wards and outpatient clinics and at
home. Recommendations cannot therefore be
specific, but the manufacturer’s instructions on
cleaning equipment should be followed. The ease
and costs of cleaning all equipment should be taken
into account when new equipment is to be
purchased.
Mouthpieces: Where barrier filters are routinely
used, the filter itself can act as a mouthpiece.
Where barrier filters are not used, disposable
mouthpieces should be used. If only exhalation is
required, such as for a volume–time curve, mouth-
pieces incorporating a high quality, low flow
resistance one-way valve will help prevent inhala-
tion from the spirometer (B).
More recently, some manufacturers have intro-
duced single-patient use flow-heads that are dis-
posed of at the end of the testing session. These
may be pre-calibrated and appear to offer im-
proved efficiency in terms of reducing the risks of
cross-infection and the need to calibrate the
equipment on a regular basis. Further evidence is
needed regarding the accuracy and cost savings
before they can be recommended over existing
systems.
All reusable mouthpieces will come into direct
contact with mucous membranes and must be
cleaned, disinfected and dried before use with
other patients. They do not need to be sterilized.
Rubber or plastic mouthpieces should be washed
first to remove extraneous substances and any
lipstick, etc. attached to them. The choice of
disinfection method depends on what is available,
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but chemical (chlorine-releasing agent), a com-
mercial dishwasher or low-temperature steam
treatment are satisfactory (B).
Both used and clean mouthpieces should be
handled using latex powder free, non-sterile
gloves, which will provide suitable protection to
both staff and to patients.
Noseclips: These come with sponge or rubber
mounts. Sponge mounts should be discarded after
each patient. Rubber mounts should be wiped with
alcohol wipes after each patient. Of the two,
rubber is preferable and will last longer (C).
Peak flow meters: The Mini-Wright peak flow
meter is marked as single-patient use. However, it
may be used in the hospital as a reusable item if it
contains a one-way valve, which prevents patients
from inhaling from the meter. Guidelines on the
cleaning of the mini-Wright have recently been
issued and covers not only the decontamination of
these devices and the problems of multi-patient
use.109 Where peak flow meters do not have a one-
way valve then either a one-way valve mouthpiece
or a new barrier filter should be used for each
patient (C).
Breathing circuits: In practice, disinfection at
the end of each day, rather than between each
patient, should be sufficient. Both internal and
external surfaces of the tubing should be deconta-
minated. Barrier filters can also be used, either as
required or on a regular basis, and offer the
advantage of helping to protect all internal
surfaces of complex breathing circuits.
Where patients handle the equipment, such as
the flow heads of spirometers, there is a risk of
cross-infection with organisms such as MRSA, which
can be transmitted via fomites. To reduce potential
risks, the outside of the equipment should be wiped
between patients using ethanol or isopropanol-
impregnated wipes (B).
Interior workings of lung function equipment:
The complexity of the internal components of
many measuring instruments makes routine dis-
mantling and decontamination impractical. Manu-
facturers should be encouraged to produce
equipment that is easily cleaned and disinfected.
Whilst it may be possible to clean and disinfect
the equipment there is no data on how often this
should take place. Manufacturers should advise on
the agents that can be used. The frequency of
cleaning and disinfecting should be decided by
each department in consultation with the In-
fection Control department. Soda lime dust should
be removed from rolling seal spirometers by
vacuuming (B).
The water in water-sealed spirometers should be
changed regularly to maintain a low microbial load,
and careful cleaning of the spirometer bell is
required, probably every other day (B).
The use of barrier filter will provide further
protection and may reduce the need for such
regular changing of the water, although no data
exists to guide operators under these circum-
stances. It may be more practical to avoid using
such spirometers, unless there is no acceptable and
practical alternative.
Exercise testing equipment: Treadmills and cycle
ergometers should be wiped down at the end of
each testing session (C).
Where blood sampling has occurred during test-
ing, any spillages should be cleaned up as quickly as
possible, and certainly at the end of each study,
following appropriate guidelines101 (B).
Where ventilation is measured, using a pneumo-
tachograph or equivalent device located on the
inspiratory side removes problems associated with
condensation. If ventilation is measured on the
expiratory side, using a heated pneumotachograph
also reduces condensation. Cleaning of the inspira-
tory and expiratory tubes should be done at the end
of each session and the tubes not reused until
completely dry.
If a two-way non-return valve or a bi-directional
turbine device is used to measure ventilation, this
should be replaced or cleaned between patients.
Valves fitted with saliva traps are preferred as this
reduces the potential for spillage of the excessive
amounts of saliva produced by patients when
exercising.
Cleaning of these valves, such as those from Hans
Rudolf, poses some problems. These systems are
heat sensitive to temperatures above 401C and are
damaged by prolonged exposure to hypochlorite
solutions. Dismantling, washing in hand-hot soapy
water, rinsing and drying should be sufficient to
ensure adequate cleaning and disinfection.
Sleep study equipment: The majority of equip-
ment used during sleep studies comes directly into
contact with the patient’s skin. Pulse oximetry
probes have been shown to be contaminated
following use.110 It would be expected that nasal–
oral temperature sensors used to assess flow,
transcutaneous PCO2 probes and reusable electro-
des would also be contaminated. These should be
cleaned between patients using alcohol-impreg-
nated wipes and by wiping the outside surface of
the equipment, including the leads (B).
Chest wall and abdominal belts used to assess
breathing movements should be washed between
patients (C).
Silver/silver chloride electrodes should be re-
chlorided between patients using domestic bleach,
which should be handled with regard to appropriate
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Infection control of lung function equipment: a practical approach 1175
health and safety guidelines (Control of Substances
Hazardous to Health regulations in the UK).
Masks, tubes, exhalation valves and head caps
used with continuous positive airway pressure
(CPAP) or nasal intermittent positive pressure
ventilation (NIPPV) are expensive. Head caps can
be washed in an ordinary washing machine. Most of
the plastic and silicone-based components can be
reprocessed by washing in hand-hot soapy water,
wiping with alcohol-impregnated wipes and then
drying. Most of the masks also tolerate low-
temperature steam (731C) reasonably well. How-
ever, some of the nasal masks, especially the full-
face masks with plastic flap valves become
deformed at this temperature, and manual clean-
ing can be difficult. It is therefore important to
consider compatibility with available methods of
decontamination before purchasing re-usable
masks. CPAP tubes, mask frames and CO2 exhala-
tion valves can be disinfected with low-tempera-
ture steam. The number of times each component
may be reprocessed is unclear, and close visual
inspection of each component before use is
essential.
In the acute setting of an HDU, where NIPPV is
used, a mask fitting trolley can be used to
determine the correct size of mask for a patient.
The range of masks will be in contact with the
patient for a couple of minutes and can be wiped
with alcohol-impregnated wipes and returned to
the trolley. The correct size mask can then be
selected from the store (C).
Domiciliary equipment
The range of hospital-owned equipment used by
patients at home is limited. Currently there is no
evidence to suggest that failing to follow cleaning
instructions of domiciliary equipment will lead to
increased infections or hospital admissions.
Portable spirometers: These should be checked
and cleaned after each patient and cleaning should
be in accordance with the manufacturer’s recom-
mendations. Where possible, peak flow meters
should be are prescribed in place of more complex
spirometers, and the patient should retain the
meter after use. Patients should not be required to
disassemble and clean their peak flow meter
because this practice often alters meter perfor-
mance (D.P. Johns, unpublished observation).
Nebulizers: All patients should be given clear
instructions on the cleaning and maintenance their
nebulizers and compressors. This can be time-
consuming, especially if the patients are receiving
several different drugs via nebulization, each
requiring a different delivery system. Nebulizers
should be emptied at the end of each nebulization,
rinsed in hand-hot water and dried, either using a
soft paper towel or by blowing air from the
compressor unit through the chamber. Providing a
reusable chamber that is easy to dismantle and
clean will aid patient compliance with cleaning.106
Despite being given clear instructions, patients
do not always appear to comply with cleaning
requests.107
CPAP and NIPPV machines: As with nebulizers,
patients using CPAP and NIPPV machines need to be
given instructions on the cleaning of masks, head-
caps and tubing and on changing of particulate
filters. The masks, head-caps and tubing should be
cleaned in hand-hot soapy water at least weekly
and be allowed to dry before subsequent use.
Depending on the local environment, patients will
need to change the filters monthly, more often if
the environment is particularly dusty. Most mask
systems will last, on average, for about 6 months
before they need replacing.
Future research
As has been highlighted in this article, evidence to
support infection control interventions is hard to find
in the medical literature. Ultimately the most
valuable studies would measure the increase in
probability of acquiring an infection following
respiratory function tests and how particular inter-
ventions reduce this probability. However, the
difficulty in adequately monitoring patients and
selecting sufficient well-matched controls is likely
to preclude definitive studies of this nature in the
near future. This being the case, continued vigilance
in monitoring infections such as TB in respiratory
physiology patients is vital for gathering circumstan-
tial evidence of equipment-associated acquisition.
There is clear evidence that respiratory equip-
ment becomes contaminated with microorganisms
of probable respiratory tract origin during use. It
can reasonably be assumed that contaminants will
include potential pathogens occasionally. The like-
lihood that these microorganisms are breathed in
by subsequent patients has not been assessed
experimentally. An apparatus which could simulate
the breathing patterns of test patients and from
which microbiological samples could be taken
might be capable of resolving this issue and of
assessing the value of interventions designed to
minimize exposure.
A further area where research would be value
would be the microbiological safety of reused
single-patient-use devices. For example, it is well
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documented that home use nebulizers are subject
to substantial microbial contamination, but no
studies have evaluated the time course of this
contamination. Such studies, which should compare
different cleaning protocols, would be compara-
tively straightforward and would permit an evi-
dence-based recommendation of how long such
devices should be reused before replacement.
Studies evaluating the clinical consequence of
domiciliary use of contaminated nebulizers by
patients with asthma or COPD would also be useful,
but would be difficult to conduct.
Finally, with the increasing use of barrier filters
in respiratory function laboratories, there is a need
for independent assessment of the various products
available. Evaluations should include not only the
ability of the filters to remove microorganisms, but
their effect on the lung function indices being
measured due to factors including flow resistance
and low dead space. These parameters must be
monitored over a number of test cycles to evaluate
deterioration that is likely to be experienced if
barrier filters are not replaced between tests.
Disclaimer
The statements and recommendations made in this
review are based on current evidence. The authors
accept no responsibility for the subsequent adop-
tion of any recommendations made in this review.
Final implementation must be the responsibility of
the laboratory and its own infection control staff.
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